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Abstract
Value methods for solving stochastic games with
partial observability model the uncertainty about
states of the game as a probability distribution over
possible states. The dimension of this belief space
is the number of states. For many practical prob-
lems, for example in security, there are exponen-
tially many possible states which causes an insuffi-
cient scalability of algorithms for real-world prob-
lems. To this end, we propose an abstraction tech-
nique that addresses this issue of the curse of di-
mensionality by projecting high-dimensional be-
liefs to characteristic vectors of significantly lower
dimension (e.g., marginal probabilities). Our two
main contributions are (1) novel compact repre-
sentation of the uncertainty in partially observable
stochastic games and (2) novel algorithm based on
this compact representation that is based on exist-
ing state-of-the-art algorithms for solving stochas-
tic games with partial observability. Experimental
evaluation confirms that the new algorithm over the
compact representation dramatically increases the
scalability compared to the state of the art.
1 Introduction
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs) are a very
general model of dynamic multi-agent interactions under un-
certainty. This makes POSGs useful for modeling many types
of problems where players have restricted information about
the environment and they can dynamically react to other play-
ers based on limited observations of the actions of the op-
ponents. Examples include patrolling games [Basilico et
al., 2009; Vorobeychik et al., 2014; Basilico et al., 2016;
Brazdil et al., 2018], where a defender protects a set of
targets against an attacker, and pursuit-evasion [Chung et
al., 2011] where a pursuer is trying to find and apprehend
an evader. Other types of security games [Tambe, 2011;
Fang et al., 2015; Fang et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2017] can
be extended to more realistic dynamic settings if the defender
can observe and react to some information about attackers
during the game.
The generality of POSGs comes at the cost of computa-
tional complexity. Computing optimal strategies in POSGs
is highly intractable from the algorithmic perspective, even
in the two-player zero-sum setting. If we assume that both
players have partial information about the environment, the
players need to reason not only about their belief over possi-
ble states, but also about the belief the opponent has over the
possible states, beliefs over beliefs, and so on. Restricting to
subclasses of POSGs where this issue of nested beliefs does
not arise allows us to design and implement algorithms that
are guaranteed to converge to optimal strategies [Hora´k et al.,
2017; Hora´k and Bosˇansky´, 2019]. However, the scalability
of the algorithms even for this case is limited.
One of the fundamental problems is the complexity of rep-
resenting, updating, and reasoning about uncertainty over a
potentially very large state space. In these POSGs (as in
single-agent Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDPs)), beliefs are probability distributions over the pos-
sible states. This is a well-known disadvantage of these mod-
els, since memory and computation time grow rapidly due
to the curse of dimensionality. Taking a similar approach
to previous work on POMDPs (e.g., in [Roy et al., 2005;
Li et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2010]), we address this prob-
lem by introducing a compact representation of uncertainty
in POSGs, and we develop a novel algorithm based on this
representation that dramatically improves scalability.
As a motivating domain, we consider a cybersecurity ex-
ample where an attacker uses lateral movement actions to ex-
pand his control of a network without being detected. The
defender tries to observe the attacker and take actions to
protect the network by reconfiguring honeypots. A perfect-
information version of this problem was proposed in [Kam-
dem et al., 2017]. However, a more realistic model is that
the defender has a limited ability to observe the actions of
the attacker using imperfect monitoring actions. This ver-
sion of the lateral movement game with uncertainty can be
modeled as a one-sided POSG [Hora´k et al., 2017]. To use
previous algorithms to solve this POSG, the belief of the de-
fender is defined over the possible subsets of resources that
the attacker may currently control in the network. This rep-
resentation scales exponentially in the size of the network, so
it is intractable for all but the smallest examples. We return
to our motivating domain in Section 4 where key steps of our
novel algorithm are discussed specifically for this domain.
Our main technical contribution is replacing the represen-
tation of beliefs over the exponential number of possible
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states using a compact characteristic vector that captures key
information but reduces the dimensionality of the beliefs. For
POMDPs, a similar compact representation has often been se-
lected based on Principal Components Analysis [Roy et al.,
2005]. Motivated by many uses of marginal probabilities in
security games, we propose using the marginal probability
of each resource being infected as a characteristic vector, in-
stead of explicitly considering all possible subsets of infected
resources. While this offers a path to scaling to much larger
problems, it has consequences for the solution quality as well
as the construction of the solution algorithm. Many compo-
nents of state-of-the-art POSG solvers are based on manip-
ulating the full belief distribution and we show how these
can be redesigned to operate using the more compact sum-
marized belief representations. We formally define the fixed-
point equation, show that the value function in the compact
representation is still a convex function, and that solving a
compact representation of the game yields a lower bound to
the value of the original game. For our motivating domain, we
experimentally demonstrate that our novel algorithm operat-
ing on the compact representation scales significantly better
(in orders of magnitude) with a negligible loss in quality (less
than 1%) compared to the state of the art algorithm.
2 One-sided POSGs
A one-sided partially observable stochastic game [Hora´k et
al., 2017], or one-sided POSG, is an imperfect-information
two-player zero-sum infinite-horizon game with perfect re-
call represented by a tuple (S,A1, A2, O, T,R). The game
is played for an infinite number of stages. At each stage, the
game is in one of the states s ∈ S and players choose their ac-
tions a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 simultaneously. An initial state of
the game is drawn from a probability distribution b0 ∈ ∆(S)
over states termed the initial belief. The one-sided nature of
the game translates to the fact that while player 1 lacks de-
tailed information about the course of the game, player 2 is
able to observe the game perfectly (i.e., his only uncertainty
is the action a1 player 1 is about to take in the current stage).
The choice of actions determines the outcome of the
current stage: Player 1 gets an observation o ∈ O and
the game transitions to a state s′ ∈ S with probability
T (o, s′ | s, a1, a2), where s is the current state. Furthermore,
player 1 gets a reward R(s, a1, a2) for this transition, and
player 2 receives −R(s, a, a′). The rewards are discounted
over time with discount factor γ < 1.
One-sided POSGs can be solved by approximating the op-
timal value function V ∗ : ∆(S) → R using a pair of value
functions V (lower bound on V ∗) and V (upper bound on
V ∗). The algorithm proposed in [Hora´k et al., 2017] re-
fines these bounds by solving a sequence of stage games.
In each of these stage games, the algorithm focuses on de-
ciding the optimal strategies of the players in this stage (i.e.,
pi1 ∈ ∆(A1) for player 1 and pi2 : S → ∆(A2) for player 2)
while assuming that the play in the subsequent stages yields
values represented by value functions V or V , respectively.
Solving the stage games also defines the fixed point equation
for V ∗,
V ∗(b) = HV ∗(b) = min
pi2
max
pi1
(
Eb,pi1,pi2 [R] + (1)
+ γ
∑
a1,o
Prb,pi1,pi2 [a1, o] · V ∗(τ(b, a1, pi2, o))
)
,
where τ(b, a1, pi2, o) denotes the Bayesian update of the be-
lief of player 1 when he played a1 and observed o. Note that
actions of player 2 who has complete information affect the
observations player 1 receives and thus belief of player 1.
Each stage game is parameterized by the current belief b ∈
∆(S) of player 1. For piecewise-linear and convex V and
V , a stage game is solved using linear programming. We
show this linear program for V (represented as a point-wise
maximum over a set Γ of linear functions αi : ∆(S)→ R).
min V (2a)
s.t.
∑
a2
pi2(s ∧ a2) = b(s) ∀s (2b)
V ≥
∑
s,a2
pi2(s ∧ a2)R(s, a1, a2) + γ
∑
o
Va1o ∀a1 (2c)
ba1o(s′) =
∑
s,a2
pi2(s ∧ a2)T (o, s′|s, a1, a2) ∀a1, o, s′ (2d)
Va1o ≥
∑
s′
αi(s
′)ba1o(s′) ∀a1, o, αi (2e)
pi2(s ∧ a2) ≥ 0 ∀s, a2 (2f)
In this linear program, player 2 seeks a strategy pi2 for
the current stage of the game to minimize the utility V of
player 1. Here pi2(s∧ a2) stands for the joint probability (en-
sured by constraints (2b) and (2f)) that the current state of the
game is s and player 2 plays the action a2. Constraint (2c)
stands for player 1 choosing the best-responding action a1.
Constraint (2d) expresses the belief in the subsequent stage
of the game when a1 was played by player 1 and observation
o was seen (multiplied by the probability of seeing that ob-
servation), and finally constraint (2e) represents the value of
V in the belief ba1o. Such a linear program can be then com-
bined with point-based variants of the value-iteration algo-
rithm, such as Heuristic Search Value Iteration (HSVI) [Smith
and Simmons, 2004; Hora´k et al., 2017].
A different approximation scheme is used for the upper
bound V on V ∗. Instead of using the point-wise maxi-
mum over linear function, V is expressed using a set Υ =
{(b(i), y(i)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ |Υ|} of points. The lower convex hull
of this set of points is then formed to obtain the value of V (b),
V (b) = min
λ∈R|Υ|≥0
 ∑
1≤i≤|Υ|
λiy
(i) | 1Tλ = 1,
∑
1≤i≤|Υ|
λib
(i) = b
 .
(3)
Constraint (2e) can then be adapted to use this representation
of V as detailed in [Hora´k and Bosˇansky´, 2016].
3 Compact Representation of V ∗
The dimension of the value function V ∗ depends on the num-
ber of states, which can be very large in cases like our mo-
tivating domain where the number of states is exponential in
the size of the network. We propose an abstraction scheme
called summarized abstraction to decrease the dimensional-
ity of the problem by creating a simplified represenation of
the beliefs over the state space.
We associate each belief b ∈ ∆(S) in the game with a char-
acteristic vector χ(b) = A · b (for some matrix A ∈ Rk×|S|
where k  |S|) and we define an (approximate) value func-
tion V˜ ∗ : Rk → R over the space of characteristic vectors.
The main goal is to adapt algorithms based on value iter-
ation to operate over the more compact space Rk instead of
the original belief space ∆(S). First, we adapt the fixed point
equation (1) for one-sided POSGs to work with compact V˜ ∗
(instead of original V ∗) by allowing player 2 to choose any
belief that is consistent with the given characteristic vector χ.
V˜ ∗(χ) = H˜V˜ ∗(χ) = min
b|Ab=χ
min
pi2
max
pi1
(
Eb,pi1,pi2 [R] + (4)
+ γ
∑
a1,o
Prb,pi1,pi2 [a1, o] · V˜ ∗(χ(τ(b, a1, pi2, o)))
)
Next, we show that value function computed using dy-
namic operator H˜ gives a valid lower bound estimate of the
original game representation over the belief space.
Theorem 1. V˜ ∗(χ(b)) ≤ V ∗(b) for every b ∈ ∆(S).
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction. Let V˜0 be arbi-
trary and let V0 of the original game be V0(b) = V˜0(χ(b))
(i.e., V˜0 ≤ V0).
Assume V˜t(χ(b)) ≤ Vt(b) for every b ∈ ∆(S). Now
H(V˜t ◦ χ) ≤ H(Vt). The extra minimization over beliefs
b in HV˜ can only decrease the utility of the stage game and
hence
V˜t+1(χ) = H˜V˜t(χ) ≤ H(V˜t ◦χ) ≤ HVt(b) = Vt+1(b) (5)
Note that the equation (4) can also be solved using linear
programming. Consider a lower bound V˜LB on V˜ ∗ formed
as a point-wise maximum over linear functions αi(χ) =
(a(i))Tχ+z(i). We modify the linear program (2) by consid-
ering that the belief b is a variable (constrained by χ),
constraints (2b), (2c), (2d), (2f) (6a)∑
s
b(s) = 1 (6b)
A · b = χ (6c)
b(s) ≥ 0 ∀s , (6d)
and we replace the constraint (2e) to account for different rep-
resentation of V˜LB by
χa1o = A · ba1o ∀a1, o (6e)
qa1o = 1T · ba1o ∀a1, o (6f)
Va1o ≥ (a(i))T · χa1o + z(i) · qa1o ∀a1, o, αi , (6g)
where qa1o = 1T · ba1o is the probability that o is generated
when player 1 uses action a1.
1 Initialize V˜LB and V˜UB to lower and upper bound on V˜ ∗
2 while V˜UB(χ0)− V˜LB(χ0) >  do
3 Explore(χ0, , 0)
4 procedure Explore(χ, , t)
5 (b, pi2)← optimal belief and strategy of player 2 in
H˜V˜LB(χ)
6 (a1, o)← select according to heuristic
7 χ′ ← τ(χ, a1, pi2, o)
8 Update Γ and Υ based on the solutions of H˜V˜LB(χ)
and H˜V˜UB(χ)
9 if V˜UB(χ′)− V˜LB(χ′) > γ−t then
10 Explore(χ′, , R, t+ 1)
11 Update Γ and Υ based on the solutions of
H˜V˜LB(χ) and H˜V˜UB(χ)
Algorithm 1: HSVI algorithm for one-sided POSGs when
summarized abstraction is used.
Observe that the only constraints with non-zero right-hand
side in this new linear program are constraints (6b) and (6c).
This is critical in the following proof that V˜ ∗ is convex.
Theorem 2. Value function V˜ ∗ is convex.
Proof. Consider a dual formulation of the linear program (2)
updated according to equations (6). Since the only non-zero
right-hand side terms in the primal are 1 and χ, the objective
of the dual formulation is o(χ) = χT · a + z. Moreover,
this is the only place where the characteristic vector χ occurs.
Hence the polytope of the feasible solutions of the dual prob-
lem is the same for every characteristic vector χ ∈ Rk and
o(χ) (after fixing variables a and z) forms a bound on the ob-
jective value of the solution for arbitrary χ. Since we maxi-
mize over all possible o(χ) in the dual, the objective value of
the linear program (and also HV˜LB) is convex in the parame-
ter χ.
Now, starting with an arbitrary convex (e.g., linear) V˜ 0LB,
the sequence of functions {V˜ tLB}∞t=0, where V˜ t+1LB = H˜V˜ tLB,
is formed only by convex functions. Therefore, the fixed
point V˜ ∗ is also a convex function.
3.1 HSVI Algorithm for Compact POSGs
The Algorithm 1 we propose for solving abstracted games is
a modified version of the original heuristic search value it-
eration algorithm (HSVI) for solving unabstracted one-sided
POSGs [Hora´k et al., 2017]. The key difference here is that
we use the value functions V˜LB and V˜UB (instead of V and
V ) and we must have modified all parts of the algorithm to
use the abstracted representation of the beliefs.
First, we initialize bounds V˜LB and V˜UB (line 1) to valid
piecewise linear and convex lower and upper bounds on V˜ ∗
(using sets Γ of linear functions αi = (a(i))Tχ+ z(i) and Υ
of points (χ(i), y(i))). Then, we perform a sequence of trials
(lines 2–3) from the initial characteristic vector χ0 = Ab0
until the desired precision  > 0 is reached.
In each of the trials, we first compute the optimal optimistic
strategy of player 2, which in this case is the selection of the
belief b and strategy pi2 (line 5). Next, we choose the ac-
tion a1 of player 1 and the observation o (lines 6–7) so that
the excess approximation error V˜UB(χ′) − V˜LB(χ′) − γ−t
in the subsequent stage (where the belief is described by a
characteristic vector χ′ = τ(χ, a1, pi2, o)) is maximized. If
this excess approximation error is positive, we recurse to the
characteristic vector χ′ (line 10).
Before and after the recursion the bounds V˜LB(χ) and
V˜UB(χ) are improved using the solution of H˜V˜LB(χ) and
H˜V˜UB(χ) (lines 8 and 11). The update of V˜UB is straight-
forward and a new point (χ, H˜V˜UB(χ)) is added to Υ. To
obtain a new linear function to add to the set Γ, we use the
objective function o(χ) = χT · a + z (after fixing variables
a and z) of the dual linear program to (6) that forms a lower
bound on H˜V˜LB and V˜ ∗ (see the proof of Theorem 2 for more
discussion).
4 The Lateral Movement POSG
We illustrate our approach using a cybersecurity scenario
based on the critical problem of detecting and mitigating lat-
eral movement by attackers in networks. The game is played
on a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), where the vertices
V = {v1, . . . , v|V |} are sorted in topological order. The goal
of the attacker is to reach vertex v|V | from the initial source
of the infection v1 by traversing the edges of the graph, while
minimizing the cost to do so.
Initially, the attacker controls only the vertex v1, i.e., the
initial infection is I0 = {v1}. Then, in every stage of the
game, the attacker chooses a directed path P = {P (i)}ki=1
(where k is the length of the path) from any of the infected
vertices to the target vertex v|V |. Unless the defender takes
countermeasures, the attacker infects all the vertices on the
path, including the target vertex v|V |, and pays the cost of
traversing each of the edges on the path,
c−,P =
∑
P (i)∈P
C(P (i)) , (7)
where C(P (i)) is a cost associated with taking edge P (i).
The defender tries to discover the attacker and increase his
costs by deploying honeypots into the network. The honey-
pot is deployed on an edge (denote this edge h) of the graph,
and is able to detect if the attacker traverses that specific edge.
Furthermore, it also increases the cost for using the edge h to
C(h). If the attacker observes that he has traversed a honey-
pot, he may decide to change his plan and therefore does not
execute the rest of his originally intended path P . The cost of
playing a path P against a honeypot placement h is therefore
ch,P =
∑
P (i)∈P≤h
C(P (i)) + 1h∈P · [C(h)− C(h)] (8)
where P≤h is the prefix of the path P until the interaction
with the honeypot edge h,
P≤h =
{
P h 6∈ P
{P (i)}ii=1 where P (i) = h otherwise .
(9)
Since the attacker does not need to continue to execute his se-
lected path P (since the defender can reconfigure the position
of the honeypot), the new infection Ih,P becomes
Ih,P = I ∪ {v | (u, v) ∈ P≤h} . (10)
The above problem can be formalized as a one-sided POSG
where
• states are possible infections, i.e., S = 2V ,
• actions of the defender are honeypot allocations, i.e.,
A1 = E,
• actions A2 of the attacker are paths in G reaching v|V |,
• observations denote whether the defender detected the
attacker (i.e., h ∈ P ) or the attacker has reached the tar-
get v|V | while avoiding the detection, O = {det,¬det},
• transitions follow the equation (10) and observation det
is generated iff the honeypot edge h has been traversed,
• reward of the defender is the negative value of the cost
of the attacker, i.e., R(h, P ) = −ch,P ,
• discount factor of the game is γ = 1, and
• initial belief b0 of the game satisfies b0(I0) = 1.
Note that the original HSVI algorithm for one-sided POSGs
has been defined and proved for discounted problems with
γ < 1. In this particular case, however, we expect that
the convergence properties translate even to the undiscounted
case since the game is essentially finite (in a finite number of
steps, all vertices, including v|V |, get infected and the game
ends).
4.1 Characteristic Vectors
The number of states in the game is exponential in the num-
ber of vertices of the graph, |S| = 2|V |−2 + 1 (we consider
that v1 is always infected and we treat all states where v|V |
is infected as a single terminal state of the game). We pro-
pose to use marginal probabilities of a vertex being infected
as characteristic vectors χ ∈ R|V |, i.e.
χ
(b)
i =
∑
I∈S | vi∈I
b(I) , (11)
where I corresponds to some subset of possibly infected ver-
tices of the graph and b(I) denotes the original belief over
this subset of vertices being infected.
4.2 Value Function Representation
The algorithm from Section 3.1 approximates V˜ ∗ using a pair
of value functions, the lower bound V˜LB and the upper bound
V˜UB. While we have discussed the representation of the lower
bound (which is represented using a set Γ of linear functions
αi(χ) = (a
(i))Tχ + z(i)), the representation of the upper
bound is more challenging.
In the original algorithm, the value function V is defined
(see equation (3)) over the probability simplex ∆(S). In that
case, it suffices to consider |S| points in Υ to define V for
every belief. In contrary, the space of characteristic vec-
tors (i.e., marginal probabilities) is formed by a hypercube
[0, 1]|V | with 2|V | vertices, which would make the straight-
forward point representation (using equation (3)) impractical.
We can, however, leverage the fact that in this domain in-
fecting an additional node can only decrease the cost to the
R|V |
aTχ+ k
χ
V˜
U
B
(χ
)
Figure 1: Dual interpretation of the projection on the convex hull.
target (and hence V˜ ∗ is decreasing). Consider the dual for-
mulation of the optimization problem (3). In this formula-
tion, the projection of χ to the lower convex hull of a set of
points is represented by the optimal linear function aTχ + z
defining a facet of the convex hull (see Figure 1). Since V˜ ∗
is decreasing in χ, we can also enforce that aTχ + z is de-
creasing in χ (i.e., add the constraint a ≤ 0 to the dual for-
mulation). This additional constraint translates to a change of
the equality
∑
1≤i≤|Υ| λiχ
(i) = χ in the primal problem to
an inequality.
V˜UB(b) = min
λ∈R|Υ|≥0
 ∑
1≤i≤|Υ|
λiy
(i) | 1Tλ = 1,
∑
1≤i≤|Υ|
λiχ
(i) ≤ χ

(12)
Now it is sufficient that the set Υ contains just one point
(χ(i), y(i)) where χ(i) = 0|V | (instead of 2|V | points) to make
the constraint
∑
1≤i≤|Υ| λiχ
(i) ≤ χ satisfiable.
It is possible to adapt the constraint (6g) to use the repre-
sentation from (12), similarly to the original (unabstracted)
one-sided POSGs [Hora´k and Bosˇansky´, 2016], and thus ob-
tain linear program to perform the upper bound computation.
4.3 Using Marginalized Strategies in Stage Games
The linear program formed by modifications from equa-
tions (6) still requires solving the stage game for the origi-
nal, unabstracted problem. In this section, we show that it is
possible to avoid expressing the belief b expicitly, and to com-
pute the stage game directly using the characteristic vectors
and marginalized strategies of the attacker.
First, we present the representation of the stage-game
strategies of the attacker. Instead of representing joint proba-
bilities pi2(I∧P ) of choosing pathP in state I , we only model
the probability p˜i2(P ) of choosing path P aggregated over all
states S. Furthermore, we allow the attacker to choose the
probability ξ(P ∧ vi) that vertex vi is infected while he opts
to follow path P .∑
P
p˜i2(P ) = 1 (13a)
0 ≤ ξ(P ∧ vi) ≤ p˜i2(P ) ∀P, vi (13b)
p˜i2(P ) ≥ 0 ∀P (13c)
To ensure that the strategy represented by variables p˜i2 and ξ
is feasible it must be consistent with the characteristic vector
χ, where χi is the probability that the vertex vi is infected at
the beginning of the stage.∑
P
ξ(P ∧ vi) = χi ∀vi (13d)
Furthermore, the path P must start in an already infected
vertex (denoted as Pre(P )), i.e., the conditional probability
Pr[Pre(P ) ∈ I |P ] = 1 of Pre(P ) being infected when path
P is chosen is 1. Now, since ξ(P ∧ v) is the joint probability,
ξ(P ∧ v) = Pr[Pre(P ) ∈ I |P ] · p˜i2(P ),
ξ(P ∧ v) = p˜i2(P ) ∀P, v = Pre(P ) . (13e)
This representation of strategies of the attacker is sufficient
to express the expected immediate reward of the strategy p˜i2,
hence the constraint (2c) can be changed to use the marginal-
ized strategies,
V ≥
∑
P
p˜i2(P )ch,P +
∑
o
Vho ∀h ∈ E . (13f)
Importantly, we can also skip the computation of the be-
lief bho and compute the characteristic vector formed by the
marginals χho directly from the variables p˜i2 and ξ. We now
present the equation to compute the updated marginal χh,det
given that the attacker has been detected while traversing the
honeypot edge h.
χh,deti =
∑
P |h∈P∧P≤(·,vi)⊆P≤h
p˜i2(P ) +
∑
P |h∈P∧P≤(·,vi) 6⊆P≤h
ξ(P ∧ vi) (13g)
The first sum stands for the probability that the attacker is de-
tected while traversing edge h, but he infected vi beforehand.
The second sum represents the probability that the attacker
used edge h as well, but this time he has not infected vi us-
ing path P , however, the vertex vi has already been infected
before starting to execute path P .
Analogously, we can obtain the probability qh,det that the
attacker got detected while traversing edge h as
qh,det =
∑
P |h∈P
p˜i2(P ) . (13h)
We need not consider the subsequent stages where the at-
tacker has not been detected (i.e., ¬det observation has been
generated) or the honeypot edge h reaches the target vertex
v|V |. In each of these cases, the target vertex has been reached
and thus the value of the subsequent stage is zero.
4.4 Initializing Bounds
We now describe our approach to initialize bounds V˜LB and
V˜UB (line 1 of Algorithm 1). Denote C∗(vi) and C
∗
(vi) the
shortest (i.e., cheapest) paths from vi to the target vertex v|V |
when costs C and C, respectively, are used for all edges.
We initialize the lower bound V˜LB using two linear func-
tions α1(χ) = 0 and α2(χ) = (a(2))Tχ + z(i) such that
z(i) = C∗(v1) and a
(2)
i = C
∗(vi)− C∗(v1).
To initialize the upper bound V˜UB, we consider that exactly
one vertex vi is infected and we consider the most expensive
path C
∗
(vi) from that vertex to the target v|V |. We use the set
Υ = {(χ(j), y(j)) | 1 ≤ j ≤ |V |} of points to initialize V˜UB
where
χ
(j)
i =
{
1 i = j
0 i 6= j y
(j) = C
∗
(vj) . (14)
5 Experimental Results
In this section we experimentally evaluate the scalability and
properties of our proposed abstraction technique based on
the model from section 4. Unless stated otherwise, we con-
sider directed acyclic graphs generated from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
model with probability p = 0.5 that each of the possible
edges is included. Furthermore, we make sure to include
edges (vi, vi+1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |V | − 1. We set the costs
C(vi, vj) = j − i for every edge (vi, vj) ∈ E when the
honeypot is not deployed to (vi, vj). We do, however, ap-
ply significant penalty for traversing a honeypot edge where
C(vi, vj) = j(j − i). This setting is used to model layered
networks commonly used in critical infrastructures [Kuipers
and Fabro, 2006]. The attacker can either proceed to the sub-
sequent layer (using edge (vi, vi+1)), or use a shortcut (if
available). The costs C reflect the fact that the closer the at-
tacker is to the target, the more secure the network is (i.e., he
has to use a more expensive exploit to proceed).
All of the experiments have been evaluated on a machine
with Intel i7-8700K and 32GB of RAM. CPLEX 12.7.1 has
been used to solve the linear programs used in the algorithms.
5.1 Comparison with the Original Approach
The main challenges of applying the original algo-
rithm for solving one-sided partially observable stochastic
games [Hora´k et al., 2017] are its memory requirements and
the computational hardness of solving the stage games. The
algorithm explicitly reasons about each of the states of the
game and the probability that the attacker chooses a given
path in each of the states. In this section, we demonstrate
these challenges and illustrate the practical advantage of our
proposed algorithm.
We used a set of randomly generated graphs (with vary-
ing number of vertices) and we attempted to solve these in-
stances using both the original (unabstracted) approach and
the algorithm we presented in this paper. The parameters
used for the original algorithm follow the parameters pro-
posed in [Hora´k et al., 2017] while we modified the initial-
ization of the bounds to make it valid for the undiscounted
problem in question. The target precision  = 0.1 was used
for both algorithms.
Figure 2 shows the runtimes of the original algorithm
(when applied to the unabstracted game) and our proposed
approach. We can observe that while for small instances,
the original approach is competitive and can even outperform
our proposed approach, for larger instances with large state
spaces (the number of states in the game is up to 2|V |−2 + 1)
the compact representation used in our approach turns out to
be beneficial. Moreover, the original approach has been un-
able to solve 50% of the 11-vertex instances due to its mem-
ory requirements. In contrast, our approach relying on the
summarized abstraction based on marginal probabilities has
not exceeded 1GB of memory consumption even when ap-
plied to the most challenging 17-vertex instances.
5.2 Abstraction Quality
In this section, we focus on analyzing the abstraction quality.
In general, the summarized abstraction may lose important
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Figure 2: Comparison of the runtime of the original (unabstracted)
approach with the proposed one (using summarized abstraction).
Confidence intervals mark standard error.
|V | 5 6 7 8 9 10
V (b0)−V˜LB(χ0)
V˜LB(χ0)
(in %) 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.5
Table 1: Empirical bound on the relative distance from the equilib-
rium of the unabstracted game based on 100 instances.
information needed to derive the optimal behavior. We show,
however, that with properly designed characteristic vectors
the quality loss can be minimal.
The scalability issues of the original approach (see Fig-
ure 2) make it hard to determine the value V ∗(b0) of the orig-
inal, unabstracted game. Therefore we present the quality
analysis only for graphs with 5 ≤ |V | ≤ 10 vertices where
the original approach solved all instances considered. In Ta-
ble 1, we present the empirical bound on the relative distance
from the equilibrium of the unabstracted bound. We compare
the upper bound V (b0) computed by the original approach
for the unabstracted game with the lower bound V˜LB(χ0) on
the quality of the strategy when the abstraction is used. We
depict the maximum relative distance based on the 100 ran-
domly generated instances for each size of a graph. Observe
that in all of the cases, the empirical upper bound on the rela-
tive distance (i.e., the worst-case possible quality loss due to
abstraction) is below 1.0%. Note, that in all of the instances
the quality of the strategy found by our novel algorithm is
within the bounds of the original approach (i.e., the empirical
bounds are likely to be overestimated).
6 Conclusions
We focus on solving partially observable stochastic games
(POSGs) and the representation of partial information in
these games. In the existing algorithms for solving subclasses
of POSGs, the dimension of the belief space equals to the
number of possible states. This fact limits the scalability since
both required memory and computation time grow rapidly.
We introduce a novel abstraction method and an algorithm
for compact representation of the uncertainty in these POSGs.
Our methodology is domain-independent and we demonstrate
it on a motivating example from cybersecurity where the de-
fender protects a computer network against an attacker who
uses lateral movement in the network to reach the desired
target. Experimental results show that our novel algorithm
scales several orders of magnitude better compared to the ex-
isting state of the art with only negligible loss in quality (less
than 1%). Our paper demonstrates practical aspects of algo-
rithms for solving subclasses of POSGs and opens possibility
to use similar compact representation for other domains.
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